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Olivier Corten, The Law Against War: The Prohibition on the Use of Force in 
Contemporary International Law (Hart Publishing, 2010) 569 pp. 
 
Olivier Corten’s The Law Against War is a comprehensive, meticulously-researched study of 
contemporary international law governing the use of armed force in international relations. 
As a translated and updated version of a 2008 book published in French, it offers valuable 
insights into the positivist methodology that underpins much of the European scholarship of 
international law. Corten undertakes a rigorous analysis of state practice from 1945 onwards, 
with a view to clarifying the current meaning and scope of international law’s prohibition on 
the use of force. His central argument is that the majority of states remain attached to a strict 
interpretation of this rule. For Corten, state practice indicates that the doctrines of 
anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive force and humanitarian intervention have no basis in 
contemporary international law. His overall position accords with a traditional, restrictive 
view of the circumstances in which states are permitted to use force. 
The Law Against War is divided into two parts, with a total of eight chapters. The first part 
examines the scope of the prohibition on the use of force. In chapter one Corten identifies 
crucial methodological issues which arise in relation to determining customary international 
law on the use of force.
2
 He identifies two broad approaches: the ‘extensive’ and the 
‘restrictive’.3 The former approach views custom as a means of adapting international law to 
meet defined goals or purposes. It treats practice as the main element of custom and assigns a 
dominant role to the conduct of major states that use force, such as the United States. The 
general flexibility of the extensive approach means that changes to custom may be discerned 
in a relatively short period of time or from a small number of incidents. The restrictive 
approach, which Corten favours, employs a stricter methodology for determining the 
evolution of customary law. For the law to change there must be first, clear invocation – in 
legal terms - of a new right or novel interpretation of an existing right, and second, 
acceptance of that claim by the international community as a whole. Unsurprisingly, scholars 
who utilise the restrictive approach are less likely to recognise new limitations or exceptions 
to the prohibition on the use of force. By outlining the terms of the methodological debate 
surrounding the use of force, this first chapter helps to explain why it is that international 
lawyers can reach radically different conclusions based on analysis of the same set of facts. 
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Corten’s aim is to ‘mov[e] beyond the impression of the “dialogue of the deaf” that 
characterises the recurrent debates over the legality of military interventions’.4 
In chapter two Corten examines the meaning of ‘force’ and ‘threat of force’ in Article 2(4) of 
the United Nations Charter. On the former, he draws a distinction between ‘military force’ 
falling within the scope of this provision, and more minor ‘police measures’ governed by 
other legal regimes. The gravity of force used and the intention behind its use are the main 
criteria used to distinguish the two categories. In relation to the ‘threat of force’, Corten 
argues that state practice reveals that the concept has been interpreted narrowly, meaning that 
only clear, explicit threats of force are prohibited. Chapter three considers whether the 
prohibition on the use of force applies to non-state actors as well as states. Corten adopts a 
traditional position that views the use of force in the context of inter-state relations, asserting 
that it is a ‘rule binding States and not non-Sate actors’.5 His analysis of the Afghanistan War 
and the post 9-11 state practice involving force against non-state entities, leads him to 
conclude that the international community has not yet accepted an expanded right of self-
defence against private groups in circumstances where a host state is not legally responsible 
for an armed attack. This conservative interpretation provides a different conclusion from 
other recent studies on the applicability of self-defence against non-state actors.
6
 In chapter 
four, Corten assesses the types of circumstances that can be invoked to justify a use of force. 
He argues that the whole of the prohibition on the use of force is a jus cogens rule. Its 
peremptory status means that states cannot rely on circumstances precluding wrongfulness - 
such as necessity, distress, and countermeasures – to justify violation of the rule. 
Having analysed the meaning and scope of the prohibition on the use of force, in part two of 
The Law Against War, Corten examines exceptions or limitations to this rule.  Chapter five 
covers the situation of consent to use force, which Corten terms ‘intervention by invitation’. 
This aspect of the law governing the use of force has received little attention from scholars 
but is of significant practical importance. As Corten points out, there is no dispute that 
consent from a territorial state makes an intervening state’s use of force lawful; the 
controversial question is what constitutes valid consent. In his view, consent must be given 
‘clearly and unequivocally’ by the highest authorities of a state, prior to military intervention 
beginning, and for the specific purpose of justifying that intervention.
7
 In the context of 
internal conflict, the question of consent may be complicated by the existence of different 
authorities claiming to be the government of that state. In such circumstances, Corten 
suggests that valid consent can only be provided by the internationally recognised 
government that exercises ‘effective power’ over the territory.8  Chapter six examines United 
Nations Security Council authorisation of military action, one of the two exceptions to the 
general prohibition of the use of force. Here, Corten explains that an intervention authorised 
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by the Security Council will be lawful if it meets two conditions. First, it must comply with 
Chapter VII requirements, most notably, the need for a situation to be declared a ‘threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’. Second, the military action undertaken must 
comply with the terms of the Security Council resolution authorising force in that situation.  
This latter requirement raises questions of interpretation which can be contentious, as 
illustrated by recent debate over the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty Orginization’s 
(NATO) mandate to use force to protect civilians in Libya in 2011. Even more controversial 
is the issue of ‘presumed authorisation’, in which authorisation to use force is claimed on the 
basis of earlier (or subsequent) Security Council resolutions. The most notable example is the 
legal justification advanced by the US/UK/Australia in relation to the 2003 Iraq War. Corten 
clearly demonstrates that this argument – and other claims of presumed authorisation – did 
not receive significant support from other states, and therefore, cannot constitute valid 
authorisation of the use of force. 
Chapters seven considers self-defence, the second and most commonly invoked exception, to 
the prohibition on the use of force. This area of the law has been under considerable pressure 
recently as a result of some states claiming a broader right of self-defence that would 
encompass both pre-emptive military action, and the use of force against states which harbour 
or support non-state actors that have committed armed attacks. On the former, Corten rejects 
the notion of ‘preventive self-defence’, asserting that neither pre-emptive action against non-
imminent threats, nor the narrower category of anticipatory self-defence against an imminent 
armed attack has been accepted by the international community as a whole. In his view, self-
defence can only be exercised in response to an armed attack that has actually occurred or 
one that has ‘materially begun’.9  On claims of a right of self-defence against states that 
harbour or support non-state actors, Corten denies that widespread support for the 2001 
Afghanistan War illustrates acceptance of a lower threshold for attributing non-state conduct 
to a host state. To Corten, the absence of ‘clear legal conviction’ in favour of the harbouring 
doctrine means that an armed attack by a non-state actor will only be attributable to a host 
state where there is substantial involvement from that state.
10
  His conclusions represent a 
narrow interpretation of self-defence which remains firmly attached to a traditional, inter-
state understanding of the law on the use of force. 
The final chapter of The Law Against War examines whether there is a right of humanitarian 
intervention that would constitute a further exception to the general prohibition on the use of 
force. Interestingly, Corten includes intervention to protect a state’s nationals abroad within 
his discussion of humanitarian intervention, whereas most other authors consider these types 
of operations to be exercises of the right of self-defence. Corten’s analysis of state practice 
reveals that very few intervening states have explicitly invoked a right of humanitarian 
intervention, and that there has been little support for recognising such a right in customary 
international law. Therefore, he concludes that intervention for humanitarian purposes is 
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lawful only if there is Security Council authorisation or if consent has been obtained from a 
host state.  
Overall, The Law Against War is a comprehensive, clearly argued account of international 
law governing the use of force. It offers a thorough analysis of relevant state practice using a 
strict, positivist methodology. Corten’s conclusion that - despite recent pressures - the 
prohibition on the use of force remains largely intact, represents a reaffirmation of a 
traditional, narrow interpretation of the circumstances in which armed force is permitted. In 
this respect, it provides a powerful counter-argument to those scholars who claim significant 
changes to the law have occurred in recent years. The Law Against War is an important 
addition to the literature on the use of force and should be read by all who are interested in 
this fundamental area of international law.  
 
